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Formulating an Anarchist Sociology:
Peter Kropotkin’s Reading of Herbert Spencer
Matthew S. Adams
In his memoirs, Peter Kropotkin reflected on the occasional perils of order-
ing tea in Scotland. ‘‘I had learned English in Russia,’’ he wrote:
And . . . had translated . . . Herbert Spencer’s ‘Principles of Biology’.
But I had learned it from books, and pronounced it very badly, so
that I had the greatest difficulty in making myself understood by my
Scotch landlady . . . I remember . . . protesting that it was not a ‘cup
of tea’ that I expected at tea time, but many cups. I was afraid my
landlady took me for a glutton, but I must say . . . that neither in
the geological books I had read or . . . in Spencer’s Biology was
there any allusion to such an important matter as tea-drinking.1
Given that Herbert Spencer sometimes intimated to guests that their com-
pany was no longer wanted by plugging his ears mid-conversation, it is
perhaps no surprise that Principles of Biology (1864, 1867) was a poor
guide to social niceties.2 The salient feature of Kropotkin’s comment on
The author wishes to thank Iain Stewart and the Journal’s anonymous readers for their
perceptive comments on earlier versions of this article. Research for this paper was made
possible by funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, through
their Banting Postdoctoral Fellowship scheme.
1 Peter Kropotkin, Memoirs of a Revolutionist (London: Smith, Elder, and Co., 1899),
2:185.
2 ‘‘Two,’’ Home Life with Herbert Spencer (Bristol: J.W. Arrowsmith, 1910), 30.
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Spencer, however, is rather its indication of his early exposure to the
Englishman’s ideas. As a voluminous writer and something of a nineteenth-
century intellectual celebrity, Spencer exercised a crucial role in the develop-
ment of European social thought in this period, one eclipsed by his subse-
quent reputation as the epitome of Victorian fustiness. Spencer’s quest for
a grand theoretical synthesis to uncover the forces that govern social life,
viewing social and individual development in terms of laws of natural
development borrowed from the biological sciences, fell into disfavor.3
‘‘Who now reads Spencer?’’ pondered Talcott Parsons in his influential
work The Structure of Social Action (1937). ‘‘Spencer is dead,’’ he added,
‘‘his social theory as a total structure . . . is dead.’’4
Kropotkin did read Spencer, and devoted more space to him in his
own writing than to any other social thinker. Between 1896 and 1904, for
instance, Kropotkin contributed a series of seven articles on Spencer to the
anarchist newspaper Freedom, which he had helped establish in 1886 at
the start of his exile in Britain.5 His reading of Spencer decisively shaped
the development of Kropotkin’s own social theory, but his treatment of
Spencer’s ideas was not without its issues. The tendency in the scholarship
is to understand Kropotkin’s interpretation of Spencer in three ways. Those
wishing to preserve the political relevance of Kropotkin’s ideas have tended
to downplay the awkward association with Spencer, or have concentrated
on points of divergence. Given Spencer’s status as the doyen of mechanistic
social science, Kropotkin’s debt sits awkwardly with anarchism’s stress on
non-hierarchical fluidity as the sine qua non of utopian social relation-
ships.6 The second and most common position is to acknowledge the influ-
ence of Spencer, but leave Kropotkin’s reading of his work unexplored,
3 While it is important to note that organic metaphors in Victorian social thought
stemmed from more sources than the natural sciences alone, Spencer tied his sociology to
the biological sciences more explicitly than most. See J.W. Burrow, Evolution and Society:
A Study in Victorian Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 179–
227, 262–65.
4 Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action: A Study in Social Theory (New York,
McGraw-Hill, 1937), 3, 3 n. 2.
5 Kropotkin, ‘‘Co-Operation: A Reply to Herbert Spencer [I],’’ Freedom: A Journal of
Anarchist Communism (December 1896): 117–18; Kropotkin, ‘‘Co-Operation: A Reply
to Herbert Spencer [II],’’ Freedom: A Journal of Anarchist Communism (January 1897):
1–2; Kropotkin, ‘‘Herbert Spencer [III],’’ Freedom: A Journal of Anarchist Communism
(February 1904): 7–8; Kropotkin, ‘‘Herbert Spencer [IV],’’ Freedom: A Journal of Anar-
chist Communism (April–May 1904): 15; Kropotkin, ‘‘Herbert Spencer [V],’’ Freedom:
A Journal of Anarchist Communism (June 1904): 23; Kropotkin, ‘‘Herbert Spencer [VI],’’
Freedom: A Journal of Anarchist Communism (August 1904): 31; Kropotkin, ‘‘Herbert
Spencer [VII],’’ Freedom: A Journal of Anarchist Communism (September 1904): 35.
6 Brian Morris, Kropotkin: The Politics of Community (New York: Humanity Books),
134–35, 138, 157, 249–50; Graham Purchase, Evolution and Revolution: An Introduc-
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often presenting Kropotkin’s engagement with Spencer as one of basic criti-
cism or assent, and usually focusing on the issue of social Darwinism.7 The
third position maintains that because Kropotkin drew inspiration from
Spencer’s epistemology, he tended to ‘‘underestimate the extent of the . . .
divergences’’ with other aspects of Spencer’s thought, and offer an ‘‘opti-
mistic’’ assessment of the essential compatibility of their social philoso-
phies. Stressing the ‘‘affinities’’ between his anarchism and Spencer’s radical
liberalism, Kropotkin sought to inject his politics with added credibility.8
The present article extends these interpretations by emphasizing the
multifaceted nature of Kropotkin’s reading of Spencer’s work, focusing on
three areas. He did indeed take much from Spencer. He found the epistemo-
logical basis of Spencer’s system enticing, and believed that, shorn of its
errors, his grand synthetic project was one that held important lessons for
anarchists. Kropotkin also theorized an ontology informed by Spencerian
sociology: one that saw flux as the defining feature of phenomena and equi-
librium as a temporary product of perpetual tension. Spencer therefore
provided Kropotkin with the intellectual scaffolding for his historical soci-
ology, but he also informed Kropotkin’s negotiation of specific debates.
Secondly, Kropotkin’s attempts to liberate ‘‘true Darwinism’’ from the
clutches of those seeing ‘‘woe to the weak’’ as nature’s axiom is well docu-
mented, but less attention has been paid to his technical understanding of
evolutionary theory.9 What this analysis shows is that Kropotkin, like many
evolutionists writing before the insights of modern genetics, remained
attached to the theories of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck. But more than this, it
was Spencer’s influential work on animal adaptation that was central to
Kropotkin’s attempt to navigate the debates between followers of Darwin
and supporters of Lamarck that were beginning to inform the decisive split
of these two approaches to evolution at the end of the nineteenth century.
Finally, while Kropotkin’s methodological work and writing on evolution
tion to the Life and Thought of Peter Kropotkin (Petersham: Jura, 1996). For Kropotkin’s
utopianism, see Ruth Kinna, ‘‘Anarchism and the Politics of Utopia,’’ in Anarchism and
Utopianism, ed. Laurence Davis and Ruth Kinna (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 2009), 221–40.
7 Caroline Cahm, Kropotkin and the Rise of Revolutionary Anarchism: 1872–1886
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 2, 4, 6; Martin A. Miller, Kropotkin
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 173, 189, 245. George Woodcock and Ivan
Avakumovic´, The Anarchist Prince: A Biographical Study of Peter Kropotkin (New York:
T.V. Boardman, 1970), 77, 129, 146, 194, 422.
8 David Miller, Social Justice (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), 217, 213, 215.
9 Kropotkin, Memoirs, 318, 317. See, for instance, Woodcock, Anarchist Prince, 331–37;
Lee Dugatkin, The Altruism Equation: Seven Scientists Search for the Origins of Good-
ness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
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show a clear line of influence between him and Spencer, in their politics this
relationship falters. As David Miller suggests, Kropotkin frequently stressed
the resonances between Spencer’s politics and his own. In this, Kropotkin
was partly attempting to underscore the legitimacy of his anarchism—
rearticulating a politics shaped by the history of Russian communalism and
French socialism in the language of British radicalism. At the same time,
however, Kropotkin’s critical engagement with Spencer was a fillip to his
broader challenge of competing anarchist traditions. Uniting Spencer’s
political failures with those of individualist anarchists such as Benjamin
Tucker, Kropotkin made the case for the importance of anarchist commu-
nism. Kropotkin’s engagement with Spencer was therefore central to the
creation of his sociology, but it was a sociology propounding a distinct
political vision.
SPECTERS OF COMTE: SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY
While Spencer frequently attempted to distinguish his philosophy from that
of Auguste Comte, Kropotkin saw their intellectual contributions acting in
tandem.10 Indeed, in Freedom, Kropotkin insisted that ‘‘whatever the
English and Germans, who imagine that they have not suffered its influence,
may say,’’ Comte’s ‘‘positive philosophy . . . impressed its mark on all the
speculations of the 19th century.’’ Contrary to Spencer’s own opinion, Kro-
potkin argued that Comte not only ‘‘gave Spencer the idea of constructing
his Synthetic Philosophy,’’ but that Spencer was in the vanguard of an intel-
lectual movement that stretched back to the French Enlightenment, notably
the ‘‘Encyclopaedists.’’11 In his extended pamphlet Modern Science and
Anarchism (1901), Kropotkin developed this position, arguing that the gen-
eral movement of ideas in the eighteenth century had been towards the
elaboration of a philosophy that integrated intellectual advancements in
other fields. Turgot, Voltaire, and Saint-Simon had taken cautious steps in
this direction, but Comte unified the natural and human sciences ‘‘in the
circle of sciences compassed by his positive philosophy.’’12
Despite this praise, Kropotkin discerned a weakness in the Comtean
10 See Spencer, ‘‘Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte,’’ in The Classi-
fication of the Sciences (New York: D. Appleton, 1864), 27–48. See also John Offer,
Herbert Spencer and Social Theory (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010), 85.
11 Kropotkin, ‘‘Herbert Spencer [III],’’ 7.
12 Kropotkin, Modern Science and Anarchism (New York, Mother Earth Publishing,
1908), 27.
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system. Following Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, an important influence on Kro-
potkin’s vision of anarchist federalism and himself a critical follower of
Comtean sociology, he discerned a worrying tendency towards hierarchy in
Comte’s social prescriptions.13 For Kropotkin, while Comte had made a
profound epistemological contribution in showing the universal applicabil-
ity of the scientific method—freeing social philosophy from its fixation with
‘‘ ‘the essence of things,’ ‘first causes,’ the ‘aim of life’ ’’—he temporized
when drawing political conclusions from his research.14 ‘‘When Comte fin-
ished his ‘Course of Positive Philosophy,’ ’’ Kropotkin suggested:
He undoubtedly must have perceived that he had not yet touched
upon the most important point—namely, the origin in man of the
moral principle and the influence of this principle upon human life
. . . and to show why man feels the necessity of obeying his moral
sense, or, at least, reckoning with it.15
Comte’s boldness deserted him, and he placed ‘‘Humanity, writ large’’ in
the place of God as the ballast of human morality. Theism crept back into
Comte’s thought, with even the ‘‘ritualism’’ of Christianity finding expres-
sion in his religion of humanity, ultimately exposing the tenacity of the
‘‘Christian education’’ that he had received.16 Aside from the fact that this
concession to religion betrayed a vulnerable commitment to rational expla-
nation, Kropotkin followed Proudhon in fearing that a reversion to theistic
thinking opened the door to forms of hierarchy traditionally promoted by
organized religion.17 Specious metaphysics, in Kropotkin’s opinion, had
always been an ecclesiastical weapon in ensuring the domination of the
many by the few, as seen in the priests whose teachings turned minds from
enquiring to ‘‘depraved’’ at the end of the medieval communalist period.18
Mirroring his subsequent treatment of Spencer, however, Kropotkin sought
to explain Comte’s failure through an appeal to historical context.19 Comte,
according to Kropotkin, wrote before ‘‘the years 1856–1862,’’ a period
13 Alex Prichard, ‘‘The Ethical Foundations of Proudhon’s Anarchism,’’ in Anarchism and
Moral Philosophy, ed. Benjamin Franks and Matthew Wilson (Basingstoke: Palgrave,
2010), 86–112 (89–90, 92–96).
14 Kropotkin, Modern Science, 25.
15 Italics are Kropotkin’s own. Ibid., 28.
16 Ibid., 29, 30.
17 Prichard, ‘‘Proudhon’s Anarchism,’’ 96–97.
18 Kropotkin, The State: Its Historic Role (London: Freedom Press, 1908), 24.
19 Miller, Social Justice, 217.
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that ‘‘has no parallel in the whole history of science for the past two thou-
sand years,’’ and in which ‘‘metaphysics’’ was truly ‘‘worsted.’’20 For Kro-
potkin, the most significant event in those years was the publication of
Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859), a book that ‘‘eclipsed all the
rest’’ in shaping the character of nineteenth-century thinking.21 He high-
lighted Darwin’s ‘‘ideas of continuous development (evolution)’’ as his
chief contribution, but added, in a phrase that revealed the continuing
prominence of Lamarckian evolutionary precepts in this period, that the
idea of species’ ‘‘continual adaptation to changing environment[s]’’ found
purchase beyond the natural sciences.22 Evolution therefore informed the
fresh study of human institutions, as seen in the work of the legal historian
Henry Maine, with the ‘‘scientific’’ treatment of historical data removing
‘‘the metaphysics which had hindered this study in exactly the same way as
the Biblical teachings had hindered the study of Geology.’’23
Kropotkin presented Spencer as acting in Comte’s train, propounding
a synthetic philosophy that removed the deficiencies of Comte’s positivism,
but, crucially, possessed weaknesses of its own. While Kropotkin noted that
Spencer’s political radicalism was an important dissenting voice in Victo-
rian Britain, he suggested that his greatest contribution lay not here, but in
his epistemological and ontological contributions. Surprisingly, he there-
fore directed his readers to look beyond Spencer’s Social Statics (1851), the
book in which he offered his famous law of equal freedom, and insisted
that as all ‘‘institutions must be subordinated’’ to this maxim, individuals
had the ‘‘right to ignore the state.’’24 Instead, Kropotkin commented that
‘‘the greatest service . . . rendered by Spencer is not to be found in his Social
Statics, but rather in the elaboration of his Synthetic Philosophy.’’25 First
Principles (1862), in which Spencer outlined his ambition for a ‘‘universal
synthesis comprehending and consolidating . . . [the] . . . special syntheses’’
of individual types of research, was identified by Kropotkin as the corner-
stone of this intellectual achievement.26 Kropotkin argued that by placing
all phenomena in an evolutionary continuum of ‘‘formation or . . . decay,’’
Spencer had pointed towards a decentered ontology of perpetual change:
20 Kropotkin, Modern Science, 30, 33.
21 Ibid., 34.
22 Ibid., 36.
23 Ibid., 37, 39.
24 Spencer, Social Statics: Or, the Conditions Essential to Human Happiness (London:
John Chapman, 1851), 206.
25 Kropotkin, ‘‘Herbert Spencer [III],’’ 7.
26 Spencer, First Principles (1862; London: Williams and Norgate, 1875), 275.
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If one accustoms oneself to this method, one truly sees that all our
institutions, our economic relations, our languages, our religions,
our music, our moral ideas, our poetry, &c., can be explained by
the same concatenation of natural events that explain the move-
ments of suns and those of the dust that circulates in space, the
colours of the rainbow and those of the butterfly.27
Kropotkin adopted this universal metaphysic as the scaffolding for his his-
torical sociology.28 This was the thrust of Modern Science and Anarchism,
in which Kropotkin attempted an historical synthesis of his own by tracing
the development of this ontology of flux in the history of contemporary
science. An analysis of Spencer is the pivotal point of this work. After a
discussion of Comte and Darwin’s epistemological influence, Kropotkin
shifts from offering a commentary on the history of European thought to
locating explicitly anarchist ideas within this greater arc.
A clearer exposition of his Spencer-inspired ontology, however, is
found in his pamphlet Anarchism: Its Philosophy and Ideal (1897).
Although Kropotkin does not cite Spencer, the argument developed is that
the modern tendency in the physical sciences has been to fragment and
decenter the understanding of phenomena. Kropotkin offers the history of
astronomy as an illustrative example. ‘‘Take any work of astronomy of the
last century,’’ he wrote, and ‘‘you will no longer find in it . . . our tiny
planet in the centre of the universe.’’ Instead, ‘‘you will meet at every step’’
the idea of a ‘‘central luminary—the sun—which by its powerful attraction
governs our planetary world.’’ But modern science has destabilized this,
too. Now, ‘‘with the astronomer, we perceive that solar systems are the
works of infinitely small bodies . . . the result of the collision among . . .
infinitely tiny clusters of matter.’’ Equilibrium is a temporary product of
‘‘numberless movements,’’ and perpetual change the basic condition of phe-
nomena: ‘‘Nothing [is] preconceived in what we call harmony in Nature.’’29
While science has revealed the complexity of phenomena, for Kropot-
kin this did not render philosophical synthesis redundant, but pressing. He
observed with approval that Spencer’s system progressed from an analysis
of physical and chemical forces in First Principles, to animal life in Princi-
ples of Biology, to the dissection of mind and society in Principles of Psy-
chology and Principles of Sociology, and morality in Principles of Ethics.
27 Kropotkin, ‘‘Herbert Spencer [IV],’’ 15.
28 Matthew S. Adams, ‘‘Kropotkin: Evolution, Revolutionary Change and the End of
History,’’ Anarchist Studies 19, no. 1 (2011): 56–81.
29 Kropotkin, Anarchism: Its Philosophy and Ideal (London: Freedom, 1897), 3, 6.
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Anarchism must possess similar ambition, he wrote, striving to ‘‘construct
a synthetic philosophy comprehending in one generalization all the phe-
nomena of nature—and therefore also the life of societies.’’30 Along with
this synthetic goal, Kropotkin opined that Spencer had furnished anarchists
with an invaluable technical method. Like Comte, Spencer had apparently
moved beyond the ‘‘verbal, metaphysical analysis’’ of phenomena to a
method that bore the imprint of ‘‘inductive science,’’ searching for ‘‘an
explanation of all social facts in natural causes, beginning with the nearest
and simplest.’’31 So, too, Kropotkin praised Spencer for avoiding Comte’s
mistake of allowing theistic thinking to creep back into his system, pro-
pounding an ‘‘absolutely agnostic, non-Christian’’ ethics and treating all
religions simply as historical phenomena.32 Kropotkin did not appreciate
the subtler manifestation of theism in Spencer’s sociology, in the way that
Spencer absorbed a ‘‘Christian Political Economics’’ in his evangelical edu-
cation, a secularized version of which found its way into his thought in his
organic vision of society and voluntarist ethics.33 Nevertheless, after prais-
ing Spencer for evading the temptations of religion, Kropotkin backtracked,
observing that Spencer had ‘‘almost but not entirely’’ freed himself of the
‘‘dead weight’’ of religion.34
Stressing that knowledge was provisional and that while science ‘‘con-
tinually . . . displaced her limits’’ new ‘‘problems to solve arose on all
sides,’’ Kropotkin chided Spencer for drawing a distinction between the
unknown and unknowable in First Principles.35 In this work, a book today
seen as a tortuous exercise in ‘‘arcane metaphysics,’’ Spencer qualified his
materialism by admitting that the ‘‘existence of the world with all it con-
tains’’ is a ‘‘mystery ever pressing for interpretation,’’ but ultimately inex-
plicable.36 Invoking an unattributed article by Frederic Harrison—probably
his 1884 piece ‘‘The Ghost of Religion’’ from the periodical Nineteenth
Century, an issue to which Kropotkin also contributed—Kropotkin argued
that Spencer’s unknowable entailed a logical aporia:
Spencer . . . affirmed that beyond a certain limit we have . . . the
unknowable, that which cannot be known by our intelligence:
30 Kropotkin, Modern Science, 53.
31 Kropotkin, ‘‘Herbert Spencer [IV],’’ 15.
32 Ibid.
33 Boyd Hilton, The Age of Atonement: The Influence of Evangelicalism on Social and
Economic Thought, 1795–1865 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), 311–13.
34 Kropotkin, ‘‘Herbert Spencer [IV],’’ 7.
35 Ibid.
36 M.W. Taylor, Men Versus the State: Herbert Spencer and Late Victorian Individualism
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 76; Spencer, First Principles, 44.
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whereupon Frederic Harrison . . . justly remarked . . . ‘‘Well, you
seem to know a good deal about this unknown of which you make
an unknowable, since you can affirm that it can not be known.’’37
Kropotkin believed that, although unexplained phenomena existed, Spen-
cer had failed to appreciate the capacity of science to explain what was
currently mysterious. Spencer’s position was contradictory, therefore, for
he discerned an unknowable that was, nevertheless, ‘‘ ‘nowise like anything
I know!’ ’’ If, as the ‘‘science of the universe’’ had shown, humans are com-
posed of the same ‘‘physical and chemical elements’’ as ‘‘Nature,’’ to admit
to the unknowable is to affirm that ‘‘it is different from all the mechanical,
chemical, intellectual, and emotional phenomena of which we have . . .
knowledge.’’38 Kropotkin thought that by limiting the reach of empirical
observation in this manner, Spencer had opened the door to mysticism,
not as egregiously as in Comte’s secular religion, but nevertheless such an
analytical error remained a potential boon for religious propagandists. In
turn, this concession to mysticism amounted to a relinquishing of power.
To admit to a ‘‘force infinitely superior to . . . our intelligence’’ with a
guiding hand in the universe cleared the path for a political tyranny that
mirrored this centralizing inflexibility. Closing this argument, Kropotkin
returned to Laplace’s famous utterance that God was an unnecessary
hypothesis, approaching this statement not as a witticism, but as a corner-
stone of his own credo. ‘‘The abstract, the absolute, god, the unknowable
. . . is a luxury, a useless superstructure, a survival that it is time to forget.’’39
Kropotkin’s reading of Spencer’s theoretical writing was fundamental
to the development of his historical sociology. Spencer, above any other
thinker, provided Kropotkin with both a method for uniting the physical
and human sciences, and with the ambition to invest anarchist political
philosophy with the language of the latest social scientific thinking. Kro-
potkin praised Spencer’s attempt to synthesize the specific researches
of individual sciences to develop a ‘‘complete system of revolutionary
philosophy,’’ and endeavored to give his social thought the same systematic
basis.40 This research, he contended, uncovered a universe defined by per-
petually antagonistic, decentred forces, a position that found support in
Spencer’s complex organicist metaphor. In addition, rational and scientific
37 Italics are Kropotkin’s own. Kropotkin, ‘‘Herbert Spencer [V],’’ 23; Frederic Harrison,
‘‘The Ghost of Religion,’’ The Nineteenth Century (March 1884): 494–506.
38 Kropotkin, ‘‘Herbert Spencer [V],’’ 23.
39 Ibid.
40 Kropotkin, ‘‘Herbert Spencer [III],’’ 24.
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analysis could overcome metaphysical explanation, a common tool of
social domination in the hands of religious authorities. Yet, crucially, this
was a critical dialogue. Kropotkin saw important weaknesses in Spencer’s
synthetic philosophy that affected its analytical purchase and, as Spencer
moved from abstract philosophy to society and politics, undermined the
efficacy of his social prescriptions.
THEORIZING EVOLUTION: DARWIN, LAMARCK,
WEISMANN, AND SPENCER
Overwhelmingly, Kropotkin’s understanding of evolutionary theory is seen
in the context of his writing on society, primarily in his most important text,
Mutual Aid (1902). Given the prominence of the ‘‘naturalistic analogy’’ in
Victorian political discourse, during which the newly prominent natural
sciences provided a variety of metaphors, this is unsurprising.41 Moreover,
Kropotkin did indeed primarily direct his polemical energy towards devel-
oping an ethical theory that highlighted the value of group solidarity and
was rooted in an analysis of historical societies. As much as Kropotkin
waded into the debates over Darwinism with the social application of the
theory in mind, however, he had an eye firmly fixed on evolution as an issue
in the natural sciences, and, like Spencer, kept abreast of these specialist
discussions. In this Kropotkin was therefore somewhat exceptional: while
Victorian thinkers promiscuously borrowed the terminology of the natural
sciences, few participated in the technical arguments concerning species’
development or engaged with the latest scientific research. For Kropotkin,
evolutionary theory mirrored the dynamic ontology outlined above, and
Darwin’s prime contribution had been the destruction of the concept of
species’ essential fixity.
A neglected aspect of Kropotkin’s Darwinism, however, is its debt to
Spencer’s theory of evolution. Given Spencer’s claims for his own unique-
ness,42 and his commitment to Lamarckian ideas, this may sound paradoxi-
cal, but Kropotkin spied the enduring importance of the inheritance of
acquired characteristics to Darwinian theory. Perturbed by the argument of
William Thomson, the future Lord Kelvin, that Charles Lyell had vastly
41 Mark Francis and John Morrow, A History of English Political Thought in the Nine-
teenth Century (London: Duckworth, 1994), 205. See also H.S. Jones, Victorian Political
Thought (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), 74–87.
42 Spencer pointedly observed in his autobiography that he owed little to Darwin’s work.
Spencer, An Autobiography (London: Williams and Norgate, 1904), 2:27–28.
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overestimated the age of the earth, Darwin had looked to ‘‘speed up the
process of evolution’’ to fit this new geochronology.43 As a result, the fifth
edition of On the Origins of Species bore the imprint of this debate, with
Darwin adding extra stress to the direct impact of the environment on spe-
cies’ development—a Lamarckian formulation that had been present, but
less prominent, in previous editions.44 In looking to the importance of
Lamarckian ideas for Darwinian evolutionism, Kropotkin was therefore
not so much pursuing an ‘‘impossible synthesis’’ as highlighting a dynamic
at work in Darwin’s efforts to create a definitive theory of evolution.45 And
in this reading, Spencer’s work was at the heart of Kropotkin’s analytical
arsenal.
Mutual Aid may be Kropotkin’s most commented-upon investigation
of Darwinism, but it was not his most detailed. In 1905, he returned explic-
itly to a theme implied in Mutual Aid, tracing the significance of Darwin’s
work to moral philosophy, suggesting that The Descent of Man (1871) had
planted the seed of an evolutionary theory of ethics.46 Writing in 1909 to
William Wray Skilbeck, editor of the retitled Nineteenth Century and After,
Kropotkin observed that important work on Darwinism remained:
I found, however, from letters received . . . that . . . I must discuss
seriously the question of Darwinian struggle for life—and mutual
aid. It is a big question as it requires a critical analysis of Natural
Selection, but of the deepest interest just now, when Lamarckian-
ism is coming so prominently to the fore.
To fill this lacuna, Kropotkin wrote that ‘‘one or two articles’’ will be neces-
sary, the ‘‘second being almost entirely devoted to Lamarckianism and Dar-
winism,’’ and presented ‘‘in the form of analysis of the evolution of
Darwin’s ideas after the publication of the ‘Origins of Species’—as it
appears from the 5 volumes of his letters.’’47 The scale of the project over-
came Kropotkin’s ambition for brevity, and the anticipated two articles
43 Joe D. Burchfield, Lord Kelvin and the Age of the Earth (New York: Neale Watson,
1975), 76.
44 For this: ibid., 76–79.
45 A´lva´ro Giron, ‘‘Kropotkin Between Lamarck and Darwin: The Impossible Synthesis,’’
Asclepio 52, no. 1 (2003): 189–213.
46 Kropotkin, ‘‘The Morality of Nature,’’ The Nineteenth Century and After (March
1905): 407–26.
47 Kropotkin to W. Wray Skilbeck, November 16, 1909, in Westminster City Archives
[Hereafter: WCA], 716/84/23.
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became a series of seven.48 Stemming from his proposition that the struggle
for survival had been overstated in accounts of natural selection, Kropotkin
increasingly focused on other factors, beyond mutual aid, that influenced
evolutionary success.
In ‘‘The Theory of Evolution and Mutual Aid,’’ Kropotkin noted Spen-
cer’s perspicacity in recognizing the importance of the ‘‘Direct Action of
Surroundings’’ on species’ development. He observed that Spencer ‘‘in
1852’’ had speculated that ‘‘experimental morphology’’ had shown that
‘‘new functions could modify a group of muscles, or an organ,’’ a conclu-
sion pointing in the direction of a similar mutability in animals.49 Kropotkin
is here referring to Spencer’s ‘‘The Development Hypothesis’’ (1852), an
article in which he took issue with the unthinking rejection of evolution,
and argued that the adaptation of organisms to their environment was an
empirically sound proposition:
The process of modification has effected, and is effecting, decided
changes in all organisms subject to modifying influences . . . Any
existing species—animal or vegetable—when placed under condi-
tions different from its previous ones, immediately begins to
undergo certain changes fitting it for the new conditions.50
For Kropotkin, there was an important echo of his ontology of flux punctu-
ated by periods of equilibrium, itself influenced by Spencer, in this percep-
tion of evolutionary adaptation. This notion of the inherent mutability of
natural life he identified as one of Darwin’s chief contributions, destroying
as it did the foundation of the faith in organic ‘‘immutability’’ that had
stultified scientific progress.51 Despite this, Kropotkin cautiously criticized
48 Kropotkin, ‘‘The Theory of Evolution and Mutual Aid,’’ The Nineteenth Century and
After (January 1910): 86–107; Kropotkin, ‘‘The Direct Action of Environment on
Plants,’’ The Nineteenth Century and After (July 1910): 58–77; Kropotkin, ‘‘The
Response of the Animals to their Environments [I],’’ The Nineteenth Century and After
(November 1910): 856–67; Kropotkin, ‘‘The Response of the Animals to their Environ-
ment [II],’’ The Nineteenth Century and After (December 1910): 1047–59; Kropotkin,
‘‘Inherited Variation in Plants,’’ The Nineteenth Century and After (October 1914):
816–36; Kropotkin, ‘‘Inherited Variation in Animals,’’ The Nineteenth Century and After
(November 1915): 1124–44; Kropotkin, ‘‘The Direct Action of Environment and Evolu-
tion,’’ The Nineteenth Century and After (January 1919): 70–89.
49 Italics are Kropotkin’s own. Kropotkin, ‘‘Theory of Evolution and Mutual Aid,’’ 98,
97.
50 Italics are Spencer’s own. Spencer, Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative (London:
Williams and Norgate, 1891), 1:3.
51 Kropotkin, ‘‘Theory of Evolution and Mutual Aid,’’ 88.
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Darwin’s reluctance to recognize the significance of direct adaptation to
variability, and in doing so argued that Spencer was not only in the van-
guard of this theoretical revision, but that his biological writing remained
important. Always timorous with criticism of Darwin, Kropotkin asserted
that towards the end of his life Darwin was, as his ‘‘letters, published in five
volumes by his son Francis’’ showed, coming to perceive the importance of
the ‘‘direct action of the environment.’’52 At the time of the initial publica-
tion of On the Origin of Species, however, Darwin did not recognize, ‘‘to
use Herbert Spencer’s terminology,’’ that ‘‘direct action might be . . . a
direct adaptation.’’53
Following up with Skilbeck in April 1910, Kropotkin reasserted the
continuing importance of the Lamarckian understanding of evolution, but
also hinted at a change of tack. ‘‘When I started writing,’’ he reported:
I discovered there was such a mass of material to be mentioned
and so many important issues to discuss, that I decided to treat it
in plants only, leaving animals to another essay . . . In this second
sketch Weismann’s hypothesis might be briefly dealt with. I never
imagined there should be such a mass of evidence in favour of the
direct action of environment, never mentioned in several excellent
recent books on Darwinism, and such a consensus of opinion in
favour of the action of environment.54
After writing on evolution and mutual aid, Kropotkin then published three
further essays in 1910, the first charting the importance of direct adaptation
in plant life, and then a two-part contribution on its centrality to animal
evolution. These articles further entrenched his position that adaptation to
environment was paramount, and he closed his piece on plant life with
a defense of Lamarckism. He noted that while some ‘‘Neo-Lamarckians’’
possessed a ‘‘metaphysical turn of mind’’ and appealed to what he dubbed
‘‘Hegelian Naturselec . . . to explain evolution,’’ the real motor of change
was in ‘‘the action of the physical and chemical forces affecting . . . [plants’]
. . . tissues.’’55 Kropotkin echoed Darwin in being skeptical of the teleologi-
cal thrust of Lamarckism, but thought that an important kernel of truth
remained in Lamarckian theory that must be protected from the assault of
metaphysics.56
52 Ibid., 92.
53 Italics are Kropotkin’s own. Ibid., 95.
54 Kropotkin to Skilbeck, April 14, 1910, in WCA, 716/84/39.
55 Kropotkin, ‘‘The Direct Action of Environment on Plants,’’ 77.
56 Daniel P. Todes, Darwin without Malthus: The Struggle for Existence in Russian Evo-
lutionary Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 141.
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A case in point is his treatment of the German evolutionary biologist
August Weismann, where Kropotkin resurrected this charge of metaphysi-
cal speciousness. His evaluation of Weismann’s germ-plasm theory is
uncharacteristically prickly, something perhaps explainable given Weis-
mann’s subsequent reputation as the gravedigger of Lamarckian theory.
Indeed, privately, in a letter to the Russian biologist Marie Goldsmith, Kro-
potkin adjudged Weismann ‘‘the Karl Marx of Biology, just as superficial
. . . making . . . metaphysics on a foundation that will not stand up.’’57
Weismann was initially a convinced Lamarckian, renouncing this attach-
ment in 1883 in a lecture that rejected the heritability of attributes acquired
through ‘‘use and disuse.’’58 In his influential The Germ-Plasm: A Theory
of Heredity (1893), Weismann went further, identifying ‘‘ancestral germ-
plasms,’’ a ‘‘peculiar substance of extremely complicated structure’’ from
‘‘which the new individual arises’’; a substance that ‘‘can never be formed
anew; it can only grow, multiply, and be transmitted from one generation
to another.’’59 Thus, modifications occurring within the lifetime of an indi-
vidual animal cannot be transmitted to its offspring.
Kropotkin rejected Weismann’s hypothesis, and in doing so followed
Spencer, who had himself exchanged barbs with Weismann in a series of
articles in The Contemporary Review between 1893 and 1895. For Spen-
cer, natural selection was an insufficient explanation of evolution, and he
maintained that, in consequence, ‘‘inheritance of acquired characters
becomes an important, if not the chief, cause of evolution.’’60 Weismann,
in contrast, maintained the ‘‘all-sufficiency of natural selection,’’ offer-
ing a number of examples that undermined Spencer’s argument for
use-inheritance.61 Kropotkin challenged Weismann for dissenting from
Darwin’s position on use-inheritance—something Weismann conceded—
and later contended that his argument that ‘‘variation . . . comes from with-
in’’ ran counter to ‘‘all the tendencies of modern empiric science.’’62 Rather
57 Kropotkin cited in ibid., 140.
58 Ernst Mayr, ‘‘Weismann and Evolution,’’ Journal of the History of Biology 18, no. 3
(Autumn 1985): 295–329 (313).
59 Italics are Weismann’s own. August Weismann, The Germ-Plasm: A Theory of Hered-
ity, trans. W. Newton Parker and Harriet Ro¨nnfeldt (New York: Scribner’s, 1893), xi,
xiii.
60 Spencer, ‘‘The Inadequacy of Natural Selection (Concluded),’’ The Contemporary
Review (May 1893): 439–56 (456).
61 Weismann, ‘‘The All-Sufficiency of Natural Selection: A Reply to Herbert Spencer,’’
The Contemporary Review (September 1893): 309–38.
62 Kropotkin, ‘‘Inheritance of Acquired Characters,’’ 516; Kropotkin, ‘‘The Response of
the Animals to their Environments [I],’’ 863.
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perversely given Kropotkin’s objective, he then seized on one of Weis-
mann’s early Lamarckian essays, in which Weismann had offered a quali-
fied defense of the Lamarckian principle, and highlighted a metaphysical
seam in his thought, caricaturing germ-plasm as ‘‘specks of ‘immortal’ mat-
ter.’’63 While Kropotkin proceeded to raise a number of technical objec-
tions, the crux of his argument came in the form of a restatement of
Spencer’s correctness:
One of the chief results of the discussion . . . in which Herbert
Spencer took a prominent part, was to define more accurately the
proper role of natural selection . . . Natural selection cannot be the
origin of the so-called ‘‘determinate’’ . . . variation . . . A great
number of biologists sought, therefore, the origin of variation . . .
in the direct action of surroundings; while those for whom the
main thing was to repudiate the hateful ‘‘Lamarckian factor’’ fol-
lowed their spokesman, Weismann.64
Elsewhere, he reiterated this position, arguing that Spencer’s Principles of
Biology and his exchange with Weismann had proven the primacy of
‘‘inherited variation’’ over the ‘‘selection of accidental modifications.’’ ‘‘It
is high time,’’ he soberly concluded, that the ‘‘whole subject of inherited
variations due to . . . use or disuse,’’ identified by Spencer, should be studied
‘‘seriously.’’65
Kropotkin’s criticism of Weismann showed the centrality of Lamarck-
ian ideas to his understanding of evolution, and the tenor of his critique
hints at the importance of Weismann’s work for entrenching divisions
between Darwinian and Lamarckian explanations of evolutionary change.
What had hitherto comingled, as Darwin’s concessions to use-inheritance
in later editions of his magnum opus revealed, began to polarize under
Weismann’s influence. This explains Kropotkin’s uncharacteristic enmity to
the German biologist, but it also shows the importance of Spencer’s evolu-
tionary theory in Kropotkin’s navigation of these debates, particularly in
Spencer’s capacity as an influential opponent of Weismann. Kropotkin’s
final paper on evolutionary theory, which appeared with an editorial pro-
logue stating, incorrectly, that ‘‘Prince Kropotkin,’’ by this time returned
to Russia, ‘‘has been incarcerated . . . by the accursed Bolshevists,’’ gave
63 Kropotkin, ‘‘Inheritance of Acquired Characters,’’ 518.
64 Italics are Kropotkin’s own. Ibid., 526.
65 Kropotkin, ‘‘Inherited Variation in Animals,’’ 1140, 1142.
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Weismann short shrift. Summarizing his previous articles, Kropotkin con-
cluded that ‘‘I discussed the attempt made by Weismann to prove . . .
changes could not be inherited, and the failure of this attempt.’’66 Kropot-
kin’s Spencerian rejection of Weismann was predicated on a commitment
to the idea that the natural world was fundamentally malleable, something
Kropotkin thought was imperiled by arguments based on ‘‘immortal mat-
ter.’’ Just as a reading of Spencer informed this notion of complexity in
Kropotkin’s ontology, in his evolutionary theory, Spencer was also a nota-
ble ally. Kropotkin was not only familiar with the minutiae of Spencer’s
work on evolutionary theory, but was inspired by it.
POLITICS: CONTRACTUALISM
AND INDIVIDUALIST ANARCHISM
Kropotkin’s reading of Spencer’s work on evolutionary theory succored his
attempt to stress the continuing importance of Lamarckian ideas to Dar-
winian evolution, just as his overarching epistemology and ontology
emerged from an engagement with Spencer’s theoretical writing. Neverthe-
less, despite the intoxications of scientific discovery lyrically celebrated by
Kropotkin in his autobiography, for both thinkers, the real significance of
casting a probing light on the natural world was its power to illuminate the
human condition. It was here, in the attempt to articulate the political posi-
tion that their broader philosophy supposedly adumbrated, that Kropot-
kin’s debt to Spencer faltered. While Kropotkin acknowledged Spencer as a
courageous opponent of the state—the very title The Man Versus the State
is ‘‘equivalent to a revolutionary programme,’’ he wrote—he argued that
he fell short of developing a coherent political position.67 He stated that the
root of this failure lay in Spencer’s faulty anthropological insights, but in
fact, Kropotkin’s critique of Spencer was broader, and informed his wider
attempt to distinguish anarchist communism as the preeminent variety of
anarchist thought. Conflating Spencer with representatives of the individu-
alist tradition like Tucker, Kropotkin challenged the presumptions of both.
Spencer erred, Kropotkin argued, because he possessed a characteristi-
cally British trait. ‘‘Spencer has done this work,’’ he wrote, referring to his
sociological studies:
but with the lack of comprehension for all institutions not to be
found in England which characterises the great majority of
66 Kropotkin, ‘‘The Direction Action of Environment and Evolution,’’ 70.
67 Kropotkin, Modern Science, 41.
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Englishmen. Besides, he did not know men, he had not travelled
(he had only once been to the United States and once to Italy,
where he was quite unhappy).68
This apparent failure informed Mutual Aid, although an early reference to
Spencer’s refusal to ‘‘admit the importance of mutual aid . . . for Man’’
is the only occasion Kropotkin indicted him directly.69 Given Kropotkin’s
attempt to demonstrate the significance of mutual aid as a determinant of
biological fitness, and—under the direct influence of environmental
pressures—its expression as a moral belief in human societies, it is probable
that he had Spencer’s recent work on the subject in mind. He was certainly
reading Spencer in the period when the Mutual Aid essays were first pub-
lished: in 1896 he contributed a lengthy rebuttal of the ‘‘third and last vol-
ume of his Principles of Sociology’’ to Freedom.70 Kropotkin’s dissection
focused on Spencer’s stress on contractual relationships as the social desid-
eratum, and his criticism of workers’ cooperative enterprises as essentially
‘‘unstable’’ and prone to devolving into ‘‘working-class masters employing
non-members as wage-earners.’’71 In an age when the ‘‘military utopias of
German Socialism’’ were in the ascendancy, Kropotkin noted that Spencer’s
defense of contract was a welcome corrective in the spirit of ‘‘free agree-
ment,’’ but he rejected the idea that truly cooperative labor was only achiev-
able by ‘‘the best men.’’ Rather, Spencer’s insular gaze led him to overlook
the preponderance of the ‘‘highest development of co-partnership . . .
already practised’’ across Europe, as well as its wider historical signifi-
cance.72 Turning to Russia, as the country ‘‘where the subject has been best
explored,’’ Kropotkin argued that a host of temporary and spontaneous
‘‘artels’’ cohered to meet specific labor needs. While Spencer wronghead-
edly clung to the ‘‘religion of Wagedom,’’ Kropotkin suggested that these
institutions not only arose to complete necessary work, but also organized
distribution, often abandoning ‘‘reward proportionate to merit’’ in favor of
‘‘division of produce . . . according to . . . needs.’’73
For Miller, Kropotkin’s sympathy for Spencer’s defense of contractual
68 Kropotkin, ‘‘Herbert Spencer [VI],’’ 31.
69 Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (London: William Heineman, 1902),
xv. For Mutual Aid, see Ruth Kinna, ‘‘Kropotkin’s Theory of Mutual Aid in Historical
Context,’’ International Review of Social History 40, no. 2 (August 1995): 259–83.
70 Kropotkin, ‘‘Co-Operation: A Reply to Herbert Spencer [I],’’ 116.
71 Herbert Spencer, Principles of Sociology (New York: D. Appleton, 1897), 3:567.
72 Kropotkin, ‘‘Co-Operation: A Reply to Herbert Spencer [I],’’ 116.
73 Italics are Kropotkin’s own. Ibid.
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relationships poses a problem, since Spencer saw capitalism as the quintes-
sence of contractual freedom, whereas Kropotkin favoured communistic,
‘‘solidaristic relationships.’’74 This is clear from Kropotkin’s panegyric on
Russian cooperative enterprises, which, in his presentation, are close to his
vision of communism, where distribution took place according to need.
Yet, despite his praise for Spencer’s vision of free agreement, Kropotkin’s
critique of contractualism was deeper than Miller’s argument would sug-
gest. For Kropotkin, the perniciousness of contractual relationships—
defined by Spencer as ‘‘relations determined by . . . agreement . . . to
perform services for specified payments’’—lay in their tendency to reconsti-
tute hierarchy.75 Rallying against ‘‘collectivists’’ on the left, including Karl
Marx, the American socialist Laurence Gro¨nlund, and unspecified ‘‘French
Marxists,’’ Kropotkin argued that their failing was to ‘‘begin by proclaim-
ing a revolutionary principle’’ and then ‘‘deny it.’’76 While they socialize the
means of production in their utopian schemas, their attempts to reconsti-
tute remuneration by introducing ‘‘labour notes’’ or demanding the ‘‘equal-
ization of wages,’’ fail to appreciate that services ‘‘cannot be valued in
money . . . There can be no exact measure of value . . . of . . . exchange
value, nor of use value.’’77 To distinguish the importance of the labor per-
formed would also be to accept uncritically ‘‘the inequalities of present soci-
ety,’’ Kropotkin continued, as to pay ‘‘engineers, scientists, or doctors . . .
ten or a hundred times more than a labourer’’ fails to recognize entrenched
social inequality:
Let them, therefore, not talk to us of ‘‘the cost of production’’ . . .
and tell us that a student who has gaily spent his youth in a univer-
sity has a right to a wage ten times greater than the son of a miner
who has grown pale in a mine since the age of eleven.78
Just as liberalism, in its commitment to contractual relationships as the
yardstick of freedom, fails to appreciate preexisting contexts that can make
contracts resemble ‘‘feudal obligations,’’ other forms of socialism often
follow suit, making mere cosmetic changes to these relationships.79 Some
collectivists appreciate the iniquity of the ‘‘individualist principle’’ of
74 Miller, Social Justice, 214.
75 Spencer, Principles of Sociology, 493.
76 Kropotkin, The Conquest of Bread (London: Chapman and Hall, 1906), 217, 219.
77 Italics are Kropotkin’s own. Ibid., 216, 227.
78 Italics are Kropotkin’s own. Ibid., 221, 223.
79 Ibid., 12.
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remuneration, he added, and seek to ‘‘temper’’ its baleful effects, but their
appeal to ‘‘charity . . . organized by the State’’ is only a palliative, and the
‘‘workhouse is but a step.’’80
For Spencer, the increasing complexity of modern society made
contractual relationships the most equitable organizing principle. His
evolutionary theory was integral to this idea, as he saw evolutionary
development, be it ‘‘astronomic, geologic, biologic, mental and social,’’
characterized by a move towards increasing complexity and interdepen-
dence: a trajectory from ‘‘an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity into a
definite coherent heterogeneity.’’81 Industrial society was the highest expres-
sion of this diversity, and carried with it a ‘‘re´gime of contract . . . the . . .
voluntary co-operation which accompanies’’ the ‘‘legal equality’’ of soci-
ety’s members.82 There is much in this with which Kropotkin would agree,
but the differences are indicative. Kropotkin concurred that modern socie-
ties were increasingly complex, and, consequentially, individuals ever more
interdependent. Both thinkers frequently expressed this dualistically. In
Spencer’s eyes, modern society was tending towards an individual freedom
that, given the primacy of contractual agreement, produced greater social
cohesion through the shared values vital to regulating contractual relation-
ships.83 For Kropotkin, the fluid communal institutions that characterized
anarchist society held the promise of nurturing meaningful individuality.84
Despite the broad similarity of their goals, however, they differed on their
perceived route to, and source of, social stability. While Spencer looked to
increasing specialization as the hallmark of advanced societies, with the
market meeting those needs individuals were unable to fulfill themselves,
Kropotkin decried the enervating effects of this process. His Fields, Factor-
ies and Workshops (1899) offered a sustained condemnation of the division
of labor, and proposed an economic system that integrated ‘‘brain and
manual work’’ and saw individuals free to pursue a number of productive
enterprises.85 In addition, Kropotkin cited the experience of British cooper-
atives, noting the distorting effects of market relationships. Forced to com-
pete with monopolistic industries, cooperative projects often become
80 Ibid., 232, 233, 234.
81 Spencer, First Principles, 495.
82 Italics are Spencer’s own. Herbert Spencer, The Man versus the State (London: Williams
and Norgate, 1902), 17.
83 Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Sociology (New York: D. Appleton, 1885), 1:589.
84 Kropotkin, ‘‘To Nettlau [1902],’’ Selected Writings on Anarchism and Revolution, ed.
Martin A. Miller (London: MIT Press, 1970), 293–307.
85 Kropotkin, Fields, Factories and Workshops (1899; London: Thomas Nelson, 1912),
363–409.
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‘‘imbued with a narrow egoistic spirit . . . in direct contradiction to the
spirit which Co-operation is intended to develop.’’86 Solidarity in Kropot-
kin’s social theory therefore stemmed less from the individual pursuit of
happiness, and more from a preexisting tendency towards communality,
seen in his ethics, and his stress on the necessity of distributive communism.
Kropotkin devoted significant space to challenging Spencer’s belief that
contractual relationships and market forces would maximize social free-
dom. That Kropotkin should have gone to this effort is surprising, since by
the time of his death in 1903, Spencer’s reputation had already begun to
wane. Long before Parsons, an obituary notice in the Times praised Spen-
cer’s ‘‘prodigious, almost unrivalled, capacity for acquiring, assimilating,
and co-ordinating knowledge,’’ but presented his contribution as that of a
bygone age. ‘‘With the death of Mr. Herbert Spencer,’’ it stated, ‘‘passes
away the last . . . of the greatest members of the brilliant group which
must make the Victorian age memorable in the history of literature and
thought.’’87 In one sense, Kropotkin’s engagement with Spencer’s politics
was a means of translating anarchist theory for a British audience. The
final chapters of Mutual Aid show Kropotkin’s sensitivity to his immediate
geographical context; as he searched for examples that would strengthen
his proposition that mutual aid underpinned ‘‘our ethical conceptions,’’ he
inventively seized on a number of quixotic examples familiar to British
audiences: the Lifeboat Association, ‘‘cricket, football, tennis, nine-pins,
pigeon, musical, or singing clubs,’’ and the Cyclists’ Alliance.88
In addition to this act of translation, however, Kropotkin’s critical
reading of Spencer’s politics also presented him with the opportunity to
challenge the assumptions of another tradition that had made headway in
Britain: individualist anarchism.89 Although primarily associated with the
United States—its ‘‘indigenous anarchism,’’ in the words of one historian—
individualist anarchism had a modest presence across the Atlantic, where
the movement found inspiration in the efforts of American radicals such as
Tucker.90 A prominent publisher of anarchist books and translator of key
texts including Proudhon’s What is Property?, Tucker also advanced his
86 Italics are Kropotkin’s own. Kropotkin, ‘‘Co-Operation: A Reply to Herbert Spencer
[II],’’ 1.
87 The Times, December 9, 1903, 9.
88 Kropotkin, Mutual Aid, 300, 275, 279.
89 John Quail, The Slow Burning Fuse (London: Paladin, 1978); Peter Ryley, Making
Another World Possible: Anarchism, Anti-Capitalism and Ecology in Late 19th and Early
20th Century Britain (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 51–55.
90 David DeLeon, The American as Anarchist: Reflections on Indigenous Radicalism (Bal-
timore: John Hopkins, 1978), 65.
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own anarchist vision in his highly influential periodical Liberty. Politicized
by exposure to Josiah Warren and other early American individualist anar-
chists, Tucker developed a resolute individualism that not only rejected the
authority of the state, but also discerned a tendency to authoritarianism
in the economic theory of socialist forms of anarchism.91 Rather than the
collective action favored by Kropotkin, Tucker stressed free competition as
the watchword of liberty, and saw monopoly as the chief obstacle to social
freedom. In 1888 he wrote: ‘‘The thing to be done . . . [is] to utterly uproot
Authority and give full sway . . . to Liberty’’ and ‘‘make . . . competition,
the antithesis of monopoly, universal.’’92 Unsurprisingly, Spencer was a
common touchstone for the individualists, even if they were often unclear
of their exact relation to his thought.93 Thus, on Spencer’s death, it was
noted with approval in Liberty that many newspapers were ‘‘recogniz[ing]
the unmistakably Anarchistic trend of the philosopher’s . . . teaching.’’94
Similarly, Tucker praised Spencer’s ‘‘celebrated law of equal freedom’’ but
lamented that he was not the ‘‘radical laissez faire philosopher he pretends
to be,’’ concluding that the ‘‘only true believers in laissez faire are the Anar-
chists.’’95 Victor Yarros was similarly torn. Initially an anarchist communist
before moving towards the individualists, Yarros described Spencer as an
author to whom anarchists were indebted for his ‘‘scientific and philosophi-
cal argumentation which supports their position,’’ and stated that his poli-
tics with ‘‘but a little determined consistency’’ might be anarchist.96 Yet
earlier he had condemned the insidious ‘‘danger to Liberty’’ posed by Spen-
cer’s ‘‘half-hearted’’ politics.97
Although the individualists may have been confused over their exact
relation to Spencer, Kropotkin presented Tucker’s politics as an extension
of Spencer’s, and grouped them together in order to challenge both.98 In
91 William Gary Kline, The Individualist Anarchists: A Critique of Liberalism (Lanham,
Md.: University Press of America, 1987), 57–72.
92 Benj. R. Tucker, ‘‘State Socialism and Anarchism: How far they agree, and wherein
they differ,’’ Liberty 5, no. 16 (March 1888): 2–3 and 6 (2).
93 See James J. Martin, Men Against the State: The Expositors of Individualist Anarchism
in America, 1827–1908 (New York: Libertarian Book Club, 1957), 235–37.
94 [No author], ‘‘On Picket Duty,’’ Liberty 14, no. 17 (January 1904): 1.
95 Italics are Tucker’s own. T. [Benjamin Tucker], ‘‘Children Under Anarchy,’’ Liberty 9,
no. 1 (September 1892): 2; T. [Benjamin Tucker], ‘‘The Sin of Herbert Spencer,’’ Liberty
2, no. 16 (May 1884): 4–5 (5).
96 V[ictor] Y[arros], ‘‘A Question for the Nationalists,’’ Liberty 6, no. 18 (July 1889): 4.
97 Yarros, ‘‘The Bourgeoisie’s Loyal Servants,’’ Liberty 4, no. 15 (February 1887): 4.
98 Kropotkin, ‘‘ ‘Anarchism’ from The Encyclopaedia Britannica [1910],’’ in The Con-
quest of Bread and Other Writings, ed. Marshall Shatz (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1995), 233–47 (244).
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doing so, he drew on his communist critique of the wage system as inher-
ently unfair, and returned to his theory that contractual relationships has-
tened the return of authority. He reproached ‘‘Individualist Anarchists,
such as Tucker’’ for accepting Spencer ‘‘as he stands, with his bourgeois
individualism for industrial property and his bourgeois ‘retribution’ ’’; an
interpretation that Kropotkin felt missed the true ‘‘spirit’’ of Spencer’s poli-
tics.99 Elsewhere, he gave a pre´cis of the individualist position, stating that
Tucker had adopted Spencer’s liberal maxim that ‘‘the powers of every indi-
vidual [s]hould be limited by the exercise of the equal rights of others,’’ and
added that ‘‘following H. Spencer’’ he also saw a difference between ‘‘the
encroachment on somebody’s rights and resistance to such an encroach-
ment.’’100 Committed to competition, Tucker insisted that protection ‘‘is a
service, like any other service’’ and therefore a ‘‘commodity subject to the
law of supply and demand.’’101 He reasoned that rather than private polic-
ing producing ‘‘tyrants,’’ this system would ensure stability.102 With aware-
ness of the ‘‘social truth’’ of voluntarism increasing as the state gradually
disappeared, he suggested that the ‘‘police protection’’ acting most in
accord with the voluntarist principle would, through open competition,
gain widest public support, and thus abjure bloodshed.103 Inveighing
against the violence during the Homestead Strike in Pennsylvania in 1892,
Tucker added that although his sympathies were with the strikers, in a
future state of ‘‘equal liberty’’ he would act to see the preservation of free
agreement:
If . . . laborers shall interfere with the rights of their employers, or
. . . use force upon inoffensive ‘‘scabs’’, or . . . attack their employ-
ers watchmen, whether these be Pinkerton detectives . . . or the
State militia, I pledge . . . that as an Anarchist . . . I will be among
the first to volunteer as a member of a force to repress these dis-
turbers.104
Kropotkin was unconvinced. He noted that Tucker followed Spencer in
defending violence ‘‘for enforcing the duty of keeping an agreement,’’ but
99 Kropotkin, ‘‘Herbert Spencer [VII],’’ 35.
100 Kropotkin, ‘‘Anarchism,’’ 244.
101 T. [Benjamin Tucker], ‘‘Contract or Organism, What’s That to Us?,’’ Liberty 4, no. 26
(July 1887): 4.
102 T. [Benjamin Tucker], ‘‘Competitive Protection,’’ Liberty 6, no. 5 (October 1888): 4–5
(4).
103 T. [Benjamin Tucker], ‘‘Protection, and Its Relation to Rent,’’ Liberty 6, no. 6 (Octo-
ber 1888): 4.
104 T. [Benjamin Tucker], ‘‘The Lesson of Homestead,’’ Liberty 8, no. 48 (July 1892): 2.
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cautioned that this was a sure way of ‘‘reconstituting under the heading of
‘defence’ all the functions of the state.’’105 He added elsewhere that both
Tucker’s and Spencer’s failure was not recognizing that the ‘‘function of
‘defence’ of its weaker members’’ was the historical justification for the
emergence of the state, and a remit it quickly overstepped on its path to
colonizing social life.106 More than protecting individual rights, Kropotkin
argued that the state would return to protect the ‘‘monopolies’’ that Tuck-
er’s defense of property would perpetuate. For Kropotkin, Tucker, the arch
anti-monopolist, ultimately endorsed future monopoly.107
Spencer was an important presence in the debates that sought to define
anarchism at the end of the nineteenth century. Both Kropotkin and Tucker
had misgivings about his politics and, while praising him as a trenchant
critic of the state, denied that his political views were anarchist, despite
resonances with their own positions. The complexity of this issue stems
from the fact that Kropotkin and Tucker equally denied that the other’s
politics was anarchist, on the basis that if taken to its logical ends, the
other’s thought would place limits on social freedom. For Tucker, Kropot-
kin denied ‘‘liberty in production and exchange, the most important of all
liberties,’’ while for Kropotkin, Tucker’s individualism ignored the social
basis of meaningful individuality. Moreover, Kropotkin thought that Tuck-
er’s model of free agreement was ultimately capitalistic and would lead to
the reconstitution of the state that anarchists abhorred.108 To strengthen his
criticism of the individualist anarchists, Kropotkin coupled their ideas with
those of Spencer—something that Tucker would have resisted, given his
own reservations about Spencer’s politics. Nevertheless, in Kropotkin’s
mind, both Tucker and Spencer were guilty of not being radical enough in
their attempts to transform society. While proclaiming the necessity of far-
reaching change, both thinkers fell back on the hoary myths of the ‘‘so-
called ‘Manchester school’ of economists’’: the wage system, contractual
free agreement, and assertive individualism. This battle of ideas was an
important one for Kropotkin, in that it challenged a particular type of indi-
vidualism then in the ascendency in anarchist circles.109 More than this,
105 Kropotkin, ‘‘Anarchism,’’ 244.
106 Peter Kropotkin, ‘‘Modern Science and Anarchism’’ (rev. ed.), in Evolution and Envi-
ronment, ed. George Woodcock (Montre´al: Black Rose Books, 1995), 15–107 (85).
107 Tucker was a particular opponent of the banking monopoly. See T. [Benjamin Tucker],
‘‘Monopoly, Communism, and Liberty,’’ Liberty 4, no. 18 (March 1887): 4.
108 T. [Benjamin Tucker], ‘‘General Walker and the Anarchists,’’ Liberty 5, no. 8 (Novem-
ber 1887): 4–5 and 8 (5).
109 Kinna, ‘‘Kropotkin’s Theory of Mutual Aid,’’ 268.
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though, it presented Kropotkin with the opportunity to articulate a compet-
ing anarchist communist vision of social relations that challenged the insidi-
ous values fostered by capitalism, apparently left uncontested by other
radical thinkers.
CONCLUSION
Herbert Spencer cast a long shadow over British intellectual life in the nine-
teenth century. For this reason alone, Kropotkin’s efforts to deal with his
voluminous contributions to social science were necessary as he sought to
demonstrate that anarchism was a viable political tradition with lessons
applicable to the labor struggles in Britain. The relationship between Kro-
potkin and Spencer was deeper than this, however. Kropotkin’s reading of
Spencer’s methodological writing had a profound impact on his determina-
tion to place anarchism on a sound epistemological footing. Additionally,
while adopting his methodological precepts, Kropotkin was inspired by
Spencer’s vision of the essential heterogeneity of matter, and, correspond-
ingly, the increasing complexity of society. Kropotkin made this the corner-
stone of his ontology, an all-encompassing interpretation of phenomena
that underpinned his commitment to the decentering tendencies of anar-
chism. Social stability, in his view, was the product of complexity and the
result of the temporary equalization of forces perpetually in conflict: like
the ‘‘infinitely tiny bodies that dash through space . . . with giddy swift-
ness,’’ but amount to ‘‘harmony’’ in ‘‘their whole.’’110
Similarly influential was Kropotkin’s reading of Spencer’s work on
evolution. Kropotkin was a faithful disciple of Darwin, but his was a partic-
ular interpretation that reflected contemporary arguments in the biological
sciences. His attempt to rescue Darwinism from proponents of an aggres-
sive individualism is well documented, but the articles Kropotkin contrib-
uted to The Nineteenth Century and After exploring the disagreements
between neo-Lamarckians and neo-Darwinists have received less attention.
Along with showing that he maintained a commitment to Lamarckian ideas
that he accurately discerned as also being important to Darwin’s own work,
these articles demonstrate that Kropotkin used Spencer’s evolutionary the-
ory to map a path through contemporary debates on species’ adaptability.
In his confrontations with Weismann, Kropotkin found Spencer’s own dis-
section of the German’s biological theory an instructive guide. For Kropot-
kin, one of Darwin’s key contributions had been demolishing the notion of
110 Kropotkin, Anarchism: Its Philosophy and Ideal, 3.
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fixity in species. The kind of direct adaptation championed by Lamarck
was further evidence of the essential malleability of nature for Kropotkin,
and a further echo of the overarching ontology of change at the heart of his
system. Kropotkin was therefore a characteristic Victorian social thinker in
allying his politics to the vogue biological sciences, but this rested on a
deeper engagement with this research than most exhibited.
Spencer was a thinker seduced by the pliability of organic metaphors.
But whereas his organicism possessed a ‘‘conservative twist,’’ since viewing
society as a ‘‘product of evolutionary growth’’ invalidated human attempts
to reorder it, Kropotkin’s politics rested on the assumption that this reor-
dering was a pressing necessity.111 In Kropotkin’s schema, the state was
essentially parasitical, draining the vitality of the social organism through-
out history, and existing in a fundamentally antagonistic relationship with
it.112 It was in the political realm, then, that Kropotkin and Spencer
diverged. Although he saw much of merit in Spencer’s politics, the real
significance of Kropotkin’s engagement with Spencer’s political writing was
in how it clarified the distinctiveness of anarchist communism as a tradition
of political thinking. Of particular importance was Kropotkin’s interpreta-
tion of individualist anarchism as an intellectual sibling of Spencerism.
While the individualists disputed this relationship, Kropotkin believed that
both Spencer and Tucker, in the guise of demolishing the state, reconstitu-
ted its worst features by failing to evade capitalistic values. Spencer was
therefore again at the heart of Kropotkin’s efforts to formulate an anarchist
sociology: this time not as a scholarly model to emulate, but as a political
philosopher who failed to recognize the audacity of the change required.
Concluding his final article on Spencer, Kropotkin suggested that while ‘‘we
cannot accept all’’ that Spencer had to say, he had ‘‘immeasurably contrib-
uted to the Anarchist character of the philosophy of the century . . . we
have entered.’’ 113 For Kropotkin, Spencer was not dead.
University of Victoria.
111 Jones, Victorian Political Thought, 76, 78.
112 For a classic statement of this, see Kropotkin, The State.
113 Kropotkin, ‘‘Herbert Spencer [VII],’’ 35.
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